Secular bioethicists do not speak from a place of distinction, but from within particular culturally, socially, and historically conditioned standpoints. As partisans of moral and ideological agendas, they bring their own biases, prejudices, and worldviews to their roles as ethical consultants, social advocates, and academics, attempting rhetorically to sway others and shift policy to a preferred point of view. Their pronouncements represent just one voice among others, even when delivered with strident rhetoric, in an educated and knowing tone, from within (...) institutional positions of power. This essay argues that, given the hegemony of progressive secular bioethics, traditional Christians routinely face epistemic injustice within medicine. That is, Christian knowledge regarding moral reality is all too often demeaned or dismissed, unless such norms can be translated into and defended within a secular ethos. Given such systemic bias, I argue, Christians also experience significant moral distress: they are fully aware of their moral obligations and what they ought to do, but institutionalized power structures make it nearly impossible to so act. But, Christian physicians are not mere technicians, obliged to provide whatever patients request from the list of legally available treatments. That antireligious critics seek to remove the rights of Christian physicians to limit how they practice medicine, where they do not offer or refer for abortion, euthanasia, physician-assisted suicide, and other inappropriate forms of care, is unjustified and prejudicial, singling out Christians, and other religious groups, for singular treatment. Regardless of what the law requires or institutional policy demands, however, Christians are obliged to submit to God in all things. As a result, they may at times find themselves required to engage in acts of civil disobedience. (shrink)

The legal basis of informed consent in Texas may on first examination suggest an unqualified affirmation of persons as the source of authority over themselves. This view of individuals in the practice of informed consent tends to present persons outside of any social context in general and outside of their families in particular. The actual functioning of law and medical practice in Texas, however, is far more complex. This study begins with a brief overview of the roots of Texas law (...) and public policy regarding informed consent. This surface account is then contrasted with examples drawn from the actual functioning of Texas law: Texas legislation regarding out-of-hospital do-not-resuscitate (DNR) orders. As a default approach to medical decision-making when patients lose decisional capacity and have failed to appoint a formal proxy or establish their wishes, this law establishes a defeasible presumption in favor of what the law characterizes as “qualified relatives” who can function as decision-makers for those terminal family members who lose decisional capacity. The study shows how, in the face of a general affirmation of the autonomy of individuals as if they were morally and socially isolated agents, space is nevertheless made for families to choose on behalf of their own members. The result is a multi-tier public morality, one affirming individuals as morally authoritative and the other recognizing the decisional standing of families. (shrink)

Bioethics functions within a world of deep moral pluralism; a universe of discourse debating ethical analysis, public policy, and clinical practice in which a common, generally accepted morality does not exist. While religious thinkers are often approached within a hermeneutic of suspicion for assuming moral standards that cannot be justified in rational terms, secular bioethicists routinely find themselves in exactly the same intellectual predicament. That ethical theory, proposed values, or normative content is secular, that it does not invoke God or (...) any particular religious perspective, does not mean that it is rationally grounded, necessarily true, or universally binding. As the authors in this issue of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy make clear, this normative reality directly impacts debates regarding concepts of health, illness, and disease, accounts of socially acceptable health-risky behaviors, and the political frameworks that shape public policy. As a result, honest discussion of diverse moral, religious, and political perspectives remains essential in clarifying the intellectual challenges, ethical intuitions, and ideological judgments that shape clinical practice and healthcare policy. Depending on which moral, political, or scientific concepts are guiding bioethical analysis, careful scrutiny will tend to support rather different policies and practices, each of which is likely to be worth careful consideration. (shrink)

Scholars have devoted considerable attention to the discovery by Justin D’Arms and Daniel Jacobson of a distinction between the fittingness of an emotion and the propriety of the same. Meanwhile, Christian theology has long been attentive to the relevance of Christian theology to the emotions. Although it seems that never so far have the twain discussions met, they should meet. A fitting emotion accurately construes a situation. Christian theology tells us something about the importance—or the lack thereof—of emotional fit for (...) the emotions involved in love. It is a desideratum for the emotions that they are fitting. But other desiderata for the emotional life sometimes overrule the desideratum of fit. Moreover, emotions sometimes have an effect on their own fittingness. As Kierkegaard shows, love construes its object as better than he presently is, but it also makes the object better. We should cultivate a disposition to loving emotions that are occasionally unfitting yet help to bring about better fit. I explain these things and consider how someone might go about cultivating loving emotions which are sometimes unfitting yet also restorative of fit. (shrink)

Creation of for-profit markets in organs for transplantation ignites in many deep moral repugnance. Proposals to broker organs have been denounced by the US Congress and professional groups alike. Financial incentives are believed to undermine consent, coercing the poor into selling their organs, violating human dignity, and improperly commodifying the human body; such concerns are held to trump the possibility of increasing life-sustaining transplants. While such views summarize the apparent global consensus which marks worldwide prohibition of the sale of human (...) organs, I argue that closer examination reveals significant grounds for concluding that markets would be more successful in preventing exploitation, preserving human dignity, and protecting against improper commodification than governmental bureaucratic procedures for procuring and allocating organs. (shrink)

This chapter explores the experiential reality of the family and its role in securing human well-being. I argue that the family is an epistemic category as well as an ontological category: it reveals the being of the phenomenological life-world in ways that are necessary for adequately appreciating the embodiment of human health and well-being. Without the family, there are significant areas of human flourishing about which one can neither know nor experience. The family uncovers categories of moral duties and virtues (...) central to the creation and maintenance of core areas of human well-being. Familial interactions, for example, routinely demonstrate significant forms of altruistic behavior and other-directed personal costs at levels that are atypical of nonfamilial relationships. Moreover, significant cross-cultural sociobiological data support the conclusion that family life provides social, emotional, adaptive, and financial advantages, as well as the development of affective autonomy, increased longevity, improved physical and psychological health. Conversely, traumatic changes to family life, such as the death of a spouse, are well-documented as negatively impacting personal stability, life-expectancy, and overall well-being. In short, to focus unduly on the individual in isolation from the family is to diminish this rich and significant category of human good and well-being. (shrink)

Organ procurement policy from the recently deceased recasts families into gatekeepers of a scarce medical resource. To the frustration of organ procurement teams, families do not always authorize organ donation. As a result, efforts to increase the number of organs available for transplantation often seek to limit the authority of families to refuse organ retrieval. For example, in some locales if a deceased family member has satisfied the legal conditions for first-person prior assent, a much looser and easier standard to (...) satisfy than informed consent, organ retrieval may proceed despite the family’s objections. Some countries have replaced voluntary consent to organ donation with forms of organ conscription. Often referred to under the misnomer “presumed consent,” such policies legalize the harvesting of organs at death, unless individuals exercise official options to opt out. As this article explores, however, there are good grounds for affirming the authority of the family to consent to or to deny organ donation on behalf of recently deceased family members, as well as to reject first-person assent and “presumed consent” policies of organ procurement. Insofar as individuals have failed clearly and competently to provide informed consent to organ donation, moral authorization for the use of the person and his body ought to be grounded on the foundational authority of the family, rather than the state’s supposed interests in obtaining organs for transplantation. (shrink)

This book represents a unique contribution to the field of clinical ethics consultation. What might seem at first glance to be an anthology, that is, a collection of independent essays, is actually more akin to a conversation, a shared engagement, a mutual undertaking. At the center of this conversation is a steadfastness, abiding and serious in its orientation – exemplified in these voices and contributions collected from colleagues – to explore, identify, and examine the actual conduct of individuals who engage (...) in ethics consultation practice. Although there is some helpful resemblance to an anthology, for example in the variety of ways these essays describe and depict a complex array of different standpoints regarding the practical and conceptual commitments in this growing field, more important to the Zadeh Project is the deliberate focus on explicating and probing the ways these commitments influence how a particular individual acting as an “ethics consultant” might understand and interpret the roles and prevalent expectations represented by those differing standpoints. In that light, and perhaps more urgently, this book is motivated by a mutual recognition that part and parcel with the responsibility of doing clinical ethics is an ongoing and clear need to describe and consider what clinical ethics consultants actually encounter when actively working with physicians, nurses, social workers, and other healthcare providers as well as with patients, families, and others who care about patients. As a contribution to that necessity of being accountable, this Project and the resulting book represent much more than merely collecting together the thoughts and perspectives of a group of colleagues from within a common field: this book is an attempt to display, to model through written text, a set of practices and what is at stake in these practices. (shrink)

This study explores the ways in which adolescents, even so-called “mature minors”, lack adequate development of the intellectual, affective, and emotional capacities necessary morally to consent to medical research on their own behalf. The psychological and neurophysiological data regarding brain maturation supports the conclusion that adolescents are qualitatively different types of agents than mature adults. They lack full adult maturity and personal agency. As a result, in addition to the usual requirements for IRB approval, one or both parents, or a (...) legal guardian, should provide informed consent for minor children to participate in medical research. (shrink)

While many have suggested that to withdraw medical interventions is ethically equivalent to withholding them, the moral complexity of actually withdrawing life supportive interventions from a patient cannot be ignored. Utilizing interplay between expository and narrative styles, and drawing upon our experiences with patients, families, nurses, and physicians when life supports have been withdrawn, we explore the changeable character of boundaries in end-of-life situations. We consider ways in which boundaries imply differences – for example, between cognition and performance – and (...) how the encounter with boundaries can generate altered meanings important for understanding decisions and actions in these contexts. We conclude that the reliance on mere roles to support the moral weight of withdrawing medical interventions is inadequate. Roles that lead us to such moments are exceeded by the responsibility encountered in such moments. And here, we suggest, is the momentous character of withdrawal: it presents the grave astonishment, the trembling awe, in the not-being-there of the other in death. (shrink)

The degree of incoherence, when previsions are not made in accordance with a probability measure, is measured by either of two rates at which an incoherent bookie can be made a sure loser. Each bet is considered as an investment from the points of view of both the bookie and a gambler who takes the bet. From each viewpoint, we define an amount invested (or escrowed) for each bet, and the sure loss of incoherent previsions is divided by the escrow (...) to determine the rate of incoherence. Potential applications include the treatment of arbitrage opportunities in financial markets and the degree of incoherence of classical statistical procedures. We illustrate the latter with the example of hypothesis testing at a fixed size. (shrink)

Traditional Christianity teaches that the Bible's primary referent is Jesus Christ, the Messiah, and Christians have long looked for ways to connect every passage in the Bible to the Christ. One venerable strategy is the allegorical or figurative approach of creatively interpreting any unit of biblical meaning, sometimes down to the individual words, as referencing Christ. Alternatively, we might take the biblical narrative itself as referencing Christ and find the connection of smaller units of meaning to Christ through their place (...) in that narrative. My article clarifies this topic through interaction with an exemplary practitioner of the strategy of figurative reading, the Church Father Augustine. I will first explain Augustine's reasons for his hermeneutics, which stem largely from his focus on smaller units of reference such as the word and the sentence. Then I will argue that his reasons are not persuasive if indeed the Bible does refer to Christ at a broader level, the level of narrative. (shrink)

Political metaphors do more than punch up messages; they can systematically bias observers’ attitudes toward the issue at hand. What, then, is an effective strategy for counteracting a metaphor’s influence? One could ignore or criticize the metaphor, emphasizing strong counterarguments directly pertaining to the target issue. Yet if observers rely on it to understand a complicated issue, they may be reluctant to abandon it. In this case, a “metaphor extension” strategy may be effective: Encourage observers to retain the metaphor but (...) reinterpret its meaning by considering other, less obvious implications. The current studies support this claim. Under conditions where participants gained a strong epistemic benefit from a rhetorical metaphor, they were more persuaded by a rebuttal that extended that metaphor. The studies use converging operational definitions of epistemic benefit and offer insight into how political attitudes are made and unmade. (shrink)

With rare exception, Roman Catholic moral theologians condemn the sale of human organs for transplantation. Yet, such criticism, while rhetorically powerful, often over-simplifies complex issues. Arguments for the prohibition of a market in human organs may, therefore, depend on a single premise, or a cluster of dubious and allied premises, which when examined cannot hold. In what follows, I will examine the ways in which such arguments are configured. For example, Thomas Aquinas’(1224-1274) understandings of embodiment and moral uses of the (...) body are usually interpreted as, and cited in support of, foreclosing a market in human organs. Aquinas’ principle of totality requires that one preserve the wholeness of the human body. In approaching Aquinas’ texts, I will assume the role of a revisionist who takes seriously his core commitments, while at the same time indicating that one can further develop his understanding of the body in ways which are supportive of the sale of human organs while remaining in conformity with the author's core concerns. Such considerations will provide significant grounds for concluding that a market in human organs for transplantation appreciates the embodied nature of the human person, respects the body and its parts as personal, rather than as mere things, is consistent with acknowledging God’s dominion over our lives and bodies, and constitutes an appropriate utilization of God's gifts to us. Moreover, such a market would likely create significant opportunities charitably to help others, to enhance human dignity and to protect against the serious dehumanization of current national bureaucratic procedures for organ donation. (shrink)

Smith outlines the distinctive features of ecological thought and examines two contentious areas of environmental ethics, the obligations for present generations and the relationship of humans to non-human animals.

Aristotle sets the horizons of our inquiry: What is it when we say we know something? And is the object of knowledge a universal or particular [tode ti] object? Aristotle's critique of Plato's theory of form/Forms in light of his notion of actuality has generated a variety of topics that frame our inquiry: "Understanding Eidos as Form in the Works of Aristotle as Plato's Critical Student"; "Aristotle on Plato's Forms as Causes"; "Notes on the Relationship between Plato's Parmenides and Aristotle's (...) Metaphysics Alpha"; "'Separate' and 'Inactive'? Aristotle's Most Challenging Critique of Plato's 'Forms'"; "Too Much Unity in a City Is Destructive of the City: Aristotle against Plato's Unification Project of the Polis"; "Aristotle on the Soul as Actuality"; "Delphic Piety in the De Anima of Alexander of Aphrodisias"; "Aristotle and Plotinus: Act and Potency and the Two Acts"; and "Al-Fārābīon Habit and Imagination." Here, the Peripatetic readings of form and actuality are parsed from the precipice of historical, analytic, and continental approaches to the mind/language/object problem, with advocacy of the importance of Aristotle's contribution to this inquiry for the present age. (shrink)

In this paper I will give some provisional answers to the questions how one can be a Christian philosopher rather than just a philosopher who happens to be a Christian, how one can be a Reformation philosopher rather than just a Christian philosopher whohappens to be a Reformation Christian, and how one can be a Baptist philosopher rather than just a Reformation philosopher who happens to be a Baptist. A good way to be a philosopher is to, like Socrates, seek (...) wisdom concerning spiritual good. A good wayto be a specifically Christian philosopher is to, like Augustine, seek that wisdom in Jesus Christ. A good way to be a specifically Reformation philosopher is to recognize and reflect on a distinction between two inseparable spiritual goods on which we are seeking wisdom: justification and sanctification. A good way to be a specifically Baptist philosopher, taking some inspiration from the likes of Locke and Kierkegaard, is to also recognize and reflect on some signs of these spiritual goods which Baptists emphasize: resistance to the idea of a state church and believer’s baptism. -------------------------- Received: 20/03/2023. Reviewed: 18/04/2023. Accepted: 24/04/2023. (shrink)

We all know faith and reason are not exactly the same thing. What exactly is the difference, and how are they related? A good orthodox Christian answer is that faith transcends reason, and for at least two reasons. First, the doctrines of orthodox Christian theology are beyond comprehension. Second, faith requires a total commitment when reason can provide only partial evidence. We cannot act meaningfully if we act only halfway. If evidence produces a 95-percent probability that a certain conclusion is (...) true, sometimes 100 percent is still the only way to act on it; commitment to Christ must lead all the way (perhaps unto death). -/- After a look at some definitions, some distinctions, and an illustration, I will consider what Immanuel Kant, Augustine of Hippo, William James, and Søren Kierkegaard have said about how faith goes beyond reason. Kant thinks faith goes beyond reason as a matter of necessity given the nature of morality and human knowledge. Augustine thinks faith goes beyond reason, but this is not a permanent thing; with sufficient mental training and contemplation, we may hope to achieve knowledge of God. James concurs, save that he looks to future experience rather than contemplation. Finally, Kierkegaard thinks Christian faith must always by nature go beyond reason; neither philosophical contemplation nor any experience in this life will change this; faith cannot be fully understood by reason and requires a commitment beyond what the evidence alone guarantees. (shrink)

Although Augustine is rightly associated with the rationalistic epistemology of the Platonist tradition—which holds that knowledge comes from the mind rather than from experience—there is an underappreciated, and significant, empirical aspect to his epistemology, which I aim to clarify in this article. In Augustine’s epistemology, knowledge of God depends on the history of his people, his revelation, and above all his Messiah. However, the empirical aspect of Augustine’s theology does not overrule his rationalism, but rather is integrated into it. Augustine (...) is a Christian representative of a broader epistemological tradition which includes Plato as well as Immanuel Kant and which considers warrant for our beliefs to come from the mind even as experience provides the input necessary for the process to begin. It is, of course, a Christianized version of such a nuanced rationalism: In both its rationalistic core and its empirical aspect, knowledge is explained in Christian terms: in the former because the mind does not have these ideas of its own powers but from God’s indwelling and gracious assistance, in the latter because the experience leading to knowledge is the religious experience that founded the Christian church and Scriptures. (shrink)

The first fruits of the literary career of St. Augustine, the great theologian and Christian philosopher par excellence, are the dialogues he wrote at Cassiciacum in Italy following his famous conversion in Milan in 386 AD. These four little books, largely neglected by scholars, investigate knowledge, ethics, metaphysics, the problem of evil, and the intriguing relationship of God and the soul. They also take up the ancient philosophical project of identifying the principles and practices that heal human desires in order (...) to attain happiness, renewing this philosophical endeavor with insights from Christian theology. Augustine's later books, such as the Confessions, would continue this project of healing desire, as would the writings of others including Boethius, Anselm, and Aquinas. -/- Mark Boone's The Conversion and Therapy of Desire investigates the roots of this project at Cassiciacum, where Augustine is developing a Christian theology of desire, informed by Neoplatonism but transformed by Christian teaching and practices. (shrink)

Traditionalism is a shadowy philosophy that has influenced much of the twentieth century and beyond: from the far-right to the environmental movement, from Sufi shaykhs and their followers to Trump advisor and right-wing provocateur Steve Bannon. It is a worldview that rejects modernity and instead turns to mystical truth and tradition as its guide. Mark Sedgwick, one of the world's leading scholars of Traditionalism, presents a major new analysis, pulling back the curtain on the foundations of Traditionalist philosophy, its (...) major proponents-René Guénon, Julius Evola, and Frithjof Schuon-and their thought. One of Traditionalism's fundamental pillars is perennialism, the idea that beneath all the different forms of religion there lies one single timeless and esoteric tradition. A second is the view that everything is getting worse, rather than better, over time, leading to the Traditionalist critique of modernity. Sedgwick details Traditionalism's unique ideas about self-realization, religion, politics, and many other spheres. Traditionalism provides an expansive guide to this important school of thought-one that is little-known and even less understood-and shows how pervasive these ideas have become. (shrink)

This article reports findings of a survey of college students in 3 educational settings regarding student perceptions of mass media ethics pedagogy, including course objectives, value systems examined, the use of civil law and/or ethics codes as standards of media ethics, and teaching techniques used in media ethics instruction. Of particular interest was how closely student expectations correlate with previous research findings indicating instructor techniques and goals. The results revealed several areas in which instructor goals and the student rankings were (...) not in accordance, including marked discrepancies between professor and student views on ethical standards employed, values systems examined, and teaching techniques preferred. The study concluded that most students would respond well to a stand-alone media ethics course employing a variety of teaching methods. Respondents felt the course should not emphasize universal ethics, but should respect pluralistic principles and examine various cultural interpretations of media ethics. (shrink)

Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely. To be clear, I do not think that blood transfusions necessarily...

Mark J. Cherry; The Body for Charity, Profit and Holiness: Commerce in Human Body Parts, Christian bioethics: Non-Ecumenical Studies in Medical Morality, Volume.

Argues that Plato's dialogues contain a surprisingly neglected account of Socrates' education about the love of noble virtue and that recovering this education could help broaden and deepen liberalism's moral and political horizon.

In the Deese-Roediger/McDermott paradigm, distinctive encoding of list items typically reduces false recognition of critical lures relative to a read-only control. This reduction can be due to enhanced item-specific processing, reduced relational processing, and/or increased test-based monitoring. However, it is unclear whether distinctive encoding reduces false recognition in a selective or global manner. To examine this question, participants studied DRM lists using a distinctive item-specific anagram generation task and then completed a recognition test which included both DRM critical lures and (...) either strongly related lures or weakly related lures. Compared to a read-control group, the generate groups showed increased correct recognition and decreased false recognition of all lure types. We then estimated the separate contributions of encoding and retrieval processes using signal-detection indices. Generation improved correct recognition by both increasing encoding of memory information for list words and by increasing memory monitoring at test. Generation reduced false recognition by reducing the encoding of memory information and by increasing memory monitoring at test. The reduction in false recognition was equivalent for critical lures and related lures, indicating that generation globally reduces the encoding of related non-presented items at study, while globally increasing list-theme-based monitoring at test. (shrink)

This paper critically explores key aspects of the gulf between traditional Christian bioethics and the secular moral reflections that dominate contemporary bioethics. For example, in contrast to traditional Christian morality, the established secular bioethics judges extramarital sex acts among consenting persons, whether of the same or different sexes, as at least morally permissible, affirms sexual freedom for children to develop their own sexual identity, and holds the easy availability of abortion and infanticide as central to the liberty interests of women. (...) Secular bioethics seeks to separate children from the authority of their parents, placing children themselves as in authority to make their own judgments about appropriate lifestyle choices, including sexual behaviors. As I argue, however, absent God, there exists no standpoint outside of our own cultural sociohistorically conditioned understanding from which to communicate any deeper perspective of reality or the bioethics that such a perspective would secure. Consequently, rather than discerning moral truth, secular bioethics merely affirms its own particular cultural sociohistorically conditioned ideological perspective. It is a social and political worldview bereft of definitive moral foundation, independent moral authority, or unambiguous content. (shrink)

The most important philosophy course that contemporary undergraduates may take is ethics. Concerned with how to live a human life, ethics becomes ever more urgent as life unfolds. As the teacher, a philosopher likely wonders about the interaction in the classroom. This paper explores that interaction. Taking a cue from Aristotle, it is argued that the teaching of ethics is an invitation to self-reflection and self-responsibility, more so than a passing on of a set of ethical principles or laws.

Statistical decision theory, whether based on Bayesian principles or other concepts such as minimax or admissibility, relies on minimizing expected loss or maximizing expected utility. Loss and utility functions are generally treated as unit-less numerical measures of value for consequences. Here, we address the issue of the units in which loss and utility are settled and the implications that those units have on the rankings of potential decisions. When multiple currencies are available for paying the loss, one must take explicit (...) account of which currency is used as well as the exchange rates between the various available currencies. (shrink)

The last half-century has seen enormous changes in society’s attitude toward sexuality. In the 1950s, homosexuals in the United States were routinely arrested; today, homosexual activity between consenting adults is legal in every state, with same-sex marriage legal in Massachusetts and Connecticut. In the 1950s, ambitious women were often seen as psychopathological and were told by psychoanalysts that they had penis envy that needed treatment; today, a woman has campaigned for President of the United States. Mark Blechner has lived (...) and worked through these startling changes in society, and _Sex Changes _collects papers he has written over the last 45 years on sex, gender, and sexuality. Interspersed with these papers are reflections on the changes that have occurred during that time period, both within the scope of society at large as well as in his personal experiences inside and outside of the therapeutic setting. He shows how changes in society, changes in his life, and changes in his writing on sexuality - as well as changes within psychoanalysis itself - have affected one another. One hundred years ago, psychoanalysis was at the cutting edge of new ideas about sex and gender, but in the latter half of the 20 th Century, psychoanalysts were often seen as reactionary upholders of society’s prejudices. _Sex Changes _seeks to restore the place of psychoanalysis as the "once and future queer science," and aims for a radical shift in psychoanalytic thinking about sexuality, gender, normalcy, prejudice, and the relationship of therapeutic aims and values. (shrink)